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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
IS/IFPC/CDR Date: 11/14/96

( ) RELEASE  
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FOIA Exemptions: b1  
PA Exemptions:

MR Cases Only:  
EO Citations:

( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or  
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or

TS authority (U)

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PROCESSES. DR. SOLOMON REVIEWED THE DIPLOMATIC STATE OF PLAY ON A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT FROM THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE, AND URGED THE CHINESE TO HELP FOCUS ALL EFFORTS ON THE FORMATION OF A SUPREME NATIONAL COUNCIL. NOTING THAT THE U.S. WANTS PRINCE SIHANOUK TO BE AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL FORCE, DR. SOLOMON STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE PRINCE DEMONSTRATE AS MUCH POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY INDEPENDENCE FROM THE KHMER ROUGE AS POSSIBLE. [

] DURING THE DISCUSSION, DR. SOLOMON PASSED A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRC PRESIDENT YANG SHANGKUN ON THE PERM FIVE ROLE IN ADDRESSING THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT, AND PROVIDED WRITTEN ANSWERS TO CHINESE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RECENT U.S. POLICY ADJUSTMENTS ON CAMBODIA.

3. ON THE CHINESE SIDE, AFM XU REITERATED CHINA'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE U.S. POLICY ADJUSTMENTS, [

] XU PRAISED THE RESULTS OF THE MOST RECENT PERM FIVE CONSULTATIONS, [

END SUMMARY.

4. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SOLOMON HELD TALKS ON CAMBODIA OVER LUNCH ON AUGUST 5 WITH CHINESE ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER XU DUNXIN. A/S SOLOMON WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LILLEY, DCM PASCOE AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER); AFM XU WAS ASSISTED BY MFA ASIAN DEPARTMENT ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ZHANG QING, DEPUTY DIVISION CHIEF FOR

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CAMBODIA LING XIQU, AS WELL AS BY NORTH AMERICA AND OCEANIA DIRECTOR ZHANG YIJUN AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR YANG JIECHI.

5. DR. SOLOMON NOTED THAT HE AND AFM XU HAD BEEN VISITING THE SAME PLACES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA RECENTLY, AND WELCOMED THE FACT THAT BOTH CHINA AND THE U.S. ARE BUILDING A COMMON POSITION ON CAMBODIA WITH THE ASEAN STATES. AFM XU RESPONDED THAT THE CHINESE SIDE WAS PLEASED THAT A/S SOLOMON COULD VISIT BEIJING. XU SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM THEIR LAST MEETING IN PARIS THAT DR. SOLOMON WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COME SO QUICKLY. AFM XU ALSO NOTED THAT A/S SOLOMON HAD MET THE PREVIOUS EVENING WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER TIAN ZENGPEI, AND HAD EXCHANGED VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. XU RECOMMENDED THAT THE CURRENT DISCUSSION CONCENTRATE ON CAMBODIA,

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 09 TOKYO 14222

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STATE PLEASE RETRANSMIT AS APPROPRIATE .

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US  
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/6 SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

THEN PERHAPS ADDRESS OTHER ISSUES IN THE ASIAN REGION  
IF TIME PERMITTED. ,

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COOPERATION WITH CHINA IMPORTANT TO THE U.S.  
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6. REPEATING A POINT MADE TO A-TM XU DURING THEIR  
MEETING IN PARIS ON JULY 18, A SOLOMON SAID  
SECRETARY BAKER WANTED DR. SOLOMON TO STRESS THAT THE  
SECRETARY UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF SINO-U.S.  
COOPERATION IN THE REGION, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE  
SOVIETS ARE THINKING ABOUT BECOMING MORE ACTIVE IN  
ASIA.

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8. CHINESE RESPONSE: AFM XU RESPONDED BY NOTING WITH APPRECIATION THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHES TO CONSULTATIONS WITH CHINA WHEN ADDRESSING ASIAN ISSUES. HE EMPHASIZED CHINA'S BELIEF THAT TIMELY CONSULTATIONS ARE ESSENTIAL TO EFFECTIVE COOPERATION. AFM XU ALSO AGREED THAT, DESPITE SOME RECENT PROBLEMS IN CHINA'S INTERNAL SITUATION AND THE OVERALL STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, U.S. RELATIONS WITH BOTH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE IMPORTANT. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE MANY COMMON INTERESTS, XU AVERRED, AND MANY AREAS IN WHICH TO COOPERATE. CAMBODIA IS ONE OF THESE, XU SAID.

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CAMBODIA: U.S. POLICY ADJUSTMENTS  
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9. TURNING TO SPECIFIC ISSUES CONCERNING CAMBODIA, DR. SOLOMON BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE U.S. MADE THE RECENT ADJUSTMENTS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAINTAINING DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF OUR POLICY. IF CONGRESS WERE TO END U.S. AID TO THE NCR, OUR STRATEGIC DIRECTION WOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY UPSET. ADDRESSING THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RAISED LAST WEEK BY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ZHANG, SOLOMON REAFFIRMED THAT OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT CHANGED:

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-- THE U.S. WANTS A COMPLETE END TO THE VIETNAMESE  
MILITARY PRESENCE WITH U.N. VERIFICATION;  
-- THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT THE KHMER ROUGE TO  
DOMINATE CAMBODIA, JUST AS IT DOES NOT WANT HUN SEN  
TO DOMINATE THE COUNTRY;  
-- THE U.S. WISHES TO SEE THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE ACHIEVE  
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BY CHOOSING A GOVERNMENT  
FREELY THROUGH ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE U.N.  
DR. SOLOMON ALSO STRESSED THAT THE U.S. REMAINS  
COMMITTED TO THE PERM FIVE AND PARIS CONFERENCE  
PROCESSES, AND SUPPORTS THE DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN  
JOINTLY APPROVED BY THE PERM FIVE.

10. CHINESE COMMENTS: AFM XU OFFERED SOME COMMENTS

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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 09 TOKYO 1422Z

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STATE PLEASE RETRANSMIT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US  
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/S SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM  
ON THE U.S. POLICY ADJUSTMENTS.

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11. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SOLOMON RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT, OF COURSE, THE U.S. IS WELL AWARE THAT THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM IS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE RATHER THAN A DOMESTIC ONE. WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC SUPPORT, HOWEVER, OUR POLICY COULD MOVE IN UNDESIRABLE DIRECTIONS. CITING HIS JULY 20 TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS, DR. SOLOMON REVIEWED SOME OF THE IDEAS, INCLUDING RECOGNIZING THE HUN SEN REGIME AND JOINING TOGETHER THE NCR, HUN SEN AND VIETNAM TO OPPOSE THE KR, WHICH CERTAIN AMERICANS ADVOCATE. THE PRESIDENT IS OPPOSED TO SUCH A POLICY, BUT IF HE MADE SUCH A BASIC CHANGE UNDER PRESSURE THIS WOULD TRULY AMOUNT TO A CHANGE IN THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF OUR CAMBODIAN POLICY. SUCH CHANGES WOULD MAKE CHINA AND ASEAN VERY UNHAPPY INDEED, SOLOMON SAID. FOR THIS REASON, THE U.S. DECIDED TO MAKE THE POLICY ADJUSTMENTS WE ANNOUNCED LAST MONTH, TO PRESERVE SUPPORT FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE PERM FIVE PROCESS.

12. SECRETARY BAKER EXPLAINED THIS CLEARLY TO THE  
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ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS IN JAKARTA, AND THE U.S. BELIEVES IT HAS ACHIEVED UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POLICY. WE BELIEVE A BASIS EXISTS FOR A COMMON PERCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM AND FOR COOPERATION ON ITS RESOLUTION, SOLOMON SAID. THE NEXT STEP IS TO COORDINATE THE WORK OF FONMIN ALATAS WITH THE PERM FIVE, TO BOTH FORM THE SNC AND RECONVENE THE PARIS CONFERENCE. [

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[ ] THUS, THE U.S. IS CONFIDENT THAT FONMIN ALATAS  
WILL BE HELPFUL TO OUR COMMON EFFORTS.

13. THE SITUATION IN THAILAND IS MORE COMPLICATED,  
SOLOMON SAID. NOTING THAT PREMIER LI PENG MAY MEET  
WITH PM CHATICHAI IN SINGAPORE ON HIS WAY BACK FROM  
JAKARTA, SOLOMON EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE  
COULD GAIN CHATICHAI'S COOPERATION ON THE DIRECTION OF  
THE PERM FIVE EFFORT.

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U.S. POLICY ON CAMBODIA'S U.N. SEAT: A PROBLEM FOR  
CHINA  
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14. WITH RESPECT TO THE CAMBODIA U.N. SEAT. A/S  
SOLOMON EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IS TO HAVE  
THE SEAT OCCUPIED BY A LEGITIMATELY ELECTED

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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 09 TOKYO 14222

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STATE PLEASE RETRANSMIT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CB, OH, US  
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/S SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

GOVERNMENT. UNTIL THAT OCCURS, HOWEVER, THE BEST  
ALTERNATIVE IS FOR AN SNC TO BE FORMED EARLY ENOUGH TO  
TAKE THE SEAT DURING THE UPCOMING UNGA. DR. SOLOMON  
GUESSED THAT THE U.N. SEAT ISSUE WILL BE THE TEST OF  
WHETHER OR NOT HUN SEN AND THE SRV TRULY DESIRE TO  
COOPERATE IN A POLITICAL PROCESS. OUR COMMON PURPOSE,  
THEN, IS TO GET THE FOUR FACTIONS TO FORM AN SNC OF  
INDIVIDUALS, SO IT CAN TAKE THE U.N. SEAT THIS FALL,  
HE SAID.

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16. A/S SOLOMON SAID

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE FREE ELECTIONS WE ALL SEEK WILL NOT BE HELD IN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS, HE SAID, SO NO NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE FORMED TO TAKE THE U.N. SEAT THIS FALL. NEVERTHELESS, THE U.S. THINKS IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE TO FORM THE SNC BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER; THE U.S. COULD THEN SUPPORT THE SNC TAKING THE SEAT. THUS, THE FOCUS OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS MUST BE ON GETTING THE SNC FORMED. IF HUN SEN AND THE VIETNAMESE STALL OR BLOCK THIS PROCESS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE THE PROBLEM, SOLOMON REASONED. IF THIS TRANSPIRES, THERE ARE TWO ALTERNATIVES: EITHER SET ASIDE THE ISSUE, TRYING TO AVOID A UNGA DEBATE BY "FREEZING" THE SEAT UNTIL THE SNC IS FORMED, OR PROCEEDING TO ATTEMPT TO SEAT THE CGDK, WHICH ASEAN AND CHINA WOULD SUPPORT, BUT THE U.S. COULD NOT. THE U.S. PREFERS THE FIRST OPTION, DR. SOLOMON SAID, ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID A DEBATE ON THE SEAT.

17. AFM XU ASKED WHETHER THE FIRST OPTION MEANS A VACANT SEAT OR THE STATUS QUO; A/S SOLOMON REPLIED THAT IT MEANT SETTING THE ISSUE ASIDE AND "FREEZING" THE SEAT WITH THE CGDK OCCUPYING IT. XU THEN ASKED  
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WHETHER THE U.S. PLANNED TO CAMPAIGN AGAINST SEATING THE CGDK. DR. SOLOMON RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. "PROBABLY WILL NOT MOUNT A BIG CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COALITION." BUT WARNED THAT THE EC OR VIETNAM MIGHT DO SO. SOLOMON STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WILL OPPOSE THE HUN SEN REGIME'S TAKING THE SEAT, AND ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. CURRENTLY DOES NOT PROPOSE A VACANT SEAT. SOLOMON SAID THE U.S. WILL WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH CHINA ON TACTICS AT THE UNGA ON THIS ISSUE, ESPECIALLY IF AN SNC IS NOT FORMED.

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S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 09 TOKYO 14222

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STATE PLEASE RETRANSMIT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US  
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/S SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

19. SECONDLY, AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE IN JAKARTA AFTER THE PMC, SECRETARY BAKER EXPLAINED THE U.S. POSITION ON A NUMBER OF CAMBODIAN ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THE COMPOSITION OF THE SNC. HIS REMARKS ANSWER IN PUBLIC MANY OF THE QUESTIONS POSED TO AMBASSADOR LILLEY BY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ZHANG, SOLOMON SAID. ONE POINT DESERVES SPECIAL MENTION, HE SAID: SECRETARY BAKER STRESSED THAT OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SNC WILL BE  
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EXCLUSIVELY ABOUT CAMBODIA, AND NOT ABOUT  
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS -- ALTHOUGH WE WOULD

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PROBABLY REITERATE.

OUR LONGSTANDING POLICY THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER  
NORMALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPLETE AND  
VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF PAVN TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA AND AN  
ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. [ 7 ✓

] SHOULD THE VIETNAMESE PRESS US TO  
NORMALIZE RELATIONS, A/S SOLOMON SAID, WE WILL  
REAFFIRM OUR CONSISTENT POLICY: NORMALIZATION MUST  
AWAIT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA AND ITS  
PACE AND SCOPE WILL DEPEND ON FURTHER COOPERATION ON  
POW/MIA AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN ISSUES.

21. SOVIETS WANT TO HELP: FINALLY, DR. SOLOMON SAID

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THAT FONMIN SHEVARDNAZDE SAID IN IRKUTSK THAT THE  
SOVIET UNION WANTS TO HELP FORGE A COMPREHENSIVE  
SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SRV WOULD COME TO  
THE NEW YORK TALKS PREPARED FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION,  
AND

INTIMATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN INTERESTING  
DEVELOPMENT FROM THE VIETNAMESE SIDE IN NEW YORK.  
SHEVARDNAZDE ALSO REITERATED THE PROPOSAL THAT THE  
SOVIETS WOULD MEET WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK IF THE U.S.  
AGREED TO MEET WITH HUN SEN. A/S SOLOMON TOLD AFM  
XU THAT THE U.S. DID NOT AGREE TO SUCH AN "EXCHANGE

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OF MEETINGS" AT THIS TIME, BUT WOULD CONSIDER THE IDEA FURTHER IF IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS. SOLOMON SAID THE U.S. WOULD WANT CHINESE VIEWS ABOUT THE RIGHT TIME TO HOLD SUCH A MEETING. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WANTS AN EARLY CEASEFIRE AND ARMS SUPPLY CUTOFF; THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT SUCH A STEP MUST BE PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, DR. SOLOMON SAID.

22. THUS, A/S SOLOMON OBSERVED, THE CURRENT ROUND OF DIPLOMACY IS IN AN ACTIVE PHASE. THE U.S. MAY WANT TO DISCUSS WITH CHINA HOW TO USE A CEASEFIRE OR A COMPLETE ARMS CUTOFF AS USEFUL ELEMENTS OF THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS. THE U.S. SIDE WOULD WANT TO COORDINATE SUCH DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY WITH CHINA, SOLOMON EMPHASIZED.

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CHINESE PRAISE PERM FIVE RESULTS...

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S E C R E T SECTION 06 OF 09 TOKYO 14222

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STATE PLEASE RETRANSMIT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US  
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA; A/S SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

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23. PLEASED WITH PERM FIVE RESULTS: CHINA WAS "VERY HAPPY" WITH THE RESULTS OF THE RECENTLY-CONCLUDED FIFTH ROUND OF PERM FIVE CONSULTATIONS ON CAMBODIA, XU SAID. THE POSITIVE RESULTS WERE THE FRUIT OF OUR COMMON EFFORTS, HE CONTINUED. THE FIVE WERE ABLE TO ADDRESS THE TWO MOST DIFFICULT ISSUES -- DISPOSITION OF MILITARY FORCES AND THE STRUCTURE OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS -- AND TO FORGE CONSENSUS ON THEM. IF THE FIVE CAN PERSUADE THE FOUR FACTIONS TO AGREE AS WELL, XU ARGUED, THEN THE MAJOR PART OF THE PROBLEM WOULD BE RESOLVED. "SOME WOULD SAY, PERHAPS 70 PERCENT OF THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED WITH AGREEMENT ON THESE TWO MAJOR ISSUES," XU SAID. ✓

FRANCE WILL MAKE A  
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON AUGUST 7 THAT THE TWO DOCUMENTS

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HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE PERM FIVE, XU SAID.

... BUT REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SNC PAPER

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S E C R E T SECTION 07 OF 09 TOKYO 14222

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STATE PLEASE RETRANSMIT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US  
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/S SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

27. A/S SOLOMON SAID THE U.S. APPRECIATES THAT CHINA  
HAS NOW AGREED ON THE LANGUAGE IN THE SNC PAPER IT HAD  
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RESERVED AT THE PARIS PERM FIVE MEETING. REFERRING TO  
THE ORIGINAL FRENCH TEXT OF AFM XU'S LETTER TO FRENCH

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ASIAN DIRECTOR MARTIN, SOLOMON ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF CHINA'S INTENTION WHEN SAYING THAT THE U.N. TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY (UNTAC) "NEEDS TO EXERCISE" NECESSARY POWERS. SOLOMON NOTED THAT THE FRENCH ORIGINAL SAYS "DOIT ETRE EXCERCE," WHICH HE WOULD RENDER AS "SHOULD EXERCISE," AN INTERPRETATION WHICH WOULD BE STRONGER AND WHICH THE U.S. COULD SUPPORT.

XU  
CONFIRMED THAT THIS INTERPRETATION REFLECTS CHINA'S IDEA ON THIS SUBJECT.

28. A CONVERSATION ENSUED ABOUT THE TERM "THE PARTIES" CONSTITUTING THE SNC, ABOUT WHICH CHINA HAD QUERIED THE U.S. SIDE. DR. SOLOMON SAID THE U.S. HAD RESERVED ITS POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IN PARIS, PREFERRING THE TERM "THE CAMBODIANS THEMSELVES" TO THE CURRENT "THE PARTIES" IN THE SNC DOCUMENT. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION BACK AND FORTH, AND MUTUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN RE-OPENING DISCUSSION OF THIS LANGUAGE WHILE THE FIVE WERE NOT IN SESSION, A/S SOLOMON AND APM XU AGREED THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CONTACT AND DISCUSS IDEAS ABOUT THE ISSUE.

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DISCUSSION ON THE SUPREME NATIONAL COUNCIL  
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S E C R E T SECTION 08 OF 09 TOKYO 14222

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STATE PLEASE RETRANSMIT AS APPROPRIATE

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TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US  
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/S SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

31. DR. SOLOMON THEN REPLIED TO AFM XU'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE SNC. DURING THE VIOLENCE AND GENOCIDE OF THE KR DURING THE 1970S, NO AMERICAN POLITICAL FIGURE OR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WOULD EVER BE ABLE TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE KR, SOLOMON SAID. HE CITED THE QUESTIONS ASKED DURING HIS JULY 20 TESTIMONY ON CAPITOL HILL AS EVIDENCE OF THE STRENGTH OF CONGRESSIONAL FEELINGS ON THIS ISSUE. MOREOVER, THE HISTORY OF THE CAMBODIAN PEACE PROCESS INDICATES CLEARLY THAT THE FOUR FACTIONS SIMPLY CANNOT COOPERATE. EXAMINING THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE FACTIONS AT THE PCC, THE THREE JAKARTA MEETINGS AND THE RECENT TOKYO MEETING MADE US CONCLUDE THAT HAVING "PARTIES" OR "FACTIONS" COMPOSE THE SNC IS THE WRONG WAY TO PROCEED. A/S SOLOMON REMINDED XU THAT OUR VIEWS ON THE SNC HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO HIM IN A JUNE 21 LETTER. DR. SOLOMON STRESSED THAT THE U.S.,  
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TOO, WANTS A POLITICAL, NOT A MILITARY, SETTLEMENT. THE U.S. POSITION ON A SNC COMPOSED OF INDIVIDUALS IS

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CONSISTENT WITH THAT GOAL, FOR THIS REASON, WE  
PROPOSED THAT THE SNC BE FORMED OF INDIVIDUALS WITH  
AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA WHO REPRESENT "THE FULL RANGE OF  
POLITICAL OPINION." THE U.S. AGREES WITH CHINA THAT  
THE SNC MEMBERS SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ONE ANOTHER.

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STATE PLEASE RETRANSMIT AS APPROPRIATE.

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, CB, CH, US  
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: A/S SOLOMON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH AFM

[ 34. A/S SOLOMON RESPONDED, SAYING THAT IF THE FOUR  
FACTIONS CAN AGREE TO FORM AN SNC OF INDIVIDUALS, THE  
U.S. WOULD SAY "WE SUPPORT A POLITICAL SOLUTION  
LEADING TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN CAMBODIA. IF  
THE PROPOSED MEMBERS OF THE SNC ARE ACCEPTABLE TO EACH  
OTHER AS INDIVIDUALS, THEN THE U.S. WILL NOT OPPOSE  
THE SNC." SHOULD CRITICS OF THIS POSITION ASK HOW THE  
U.S. CAN TOLERATE AN SNC THAT HAS KR PARTICIPATION,  
WE WOULD RESPOND THAT THE QUESTION IS FOR THE KHMER  
THEMSELVES TO DECIDE. MOREOVER, IF THE SNC DECIDES TO  
PERMIT THE KHMER ROUGE AS A PARTY TO PARTICIPATE IN  
ELECTIONS, WE WOULD SAY THAT THIS ISSUE IS ALSO ONE  
FOR THE CAMBODIANS TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES, AS PART  
OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT WHICH AVOIDS  
A MILITARY SOLUTION, SOLOMON SAID.

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SIHANOUK MUST BE AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL FORCE  
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35. IN THE PAST, DR. SOLOMON SAID, THE U.S. HAS

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EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT MILITARY COOPERATION ON THE GROUND BETWEEN THE ANS AND THE KR. ONE REASON WHY SOME IN CONGRESS WANT TO CURTAIL ASSISTANCE TO THE NCR WAS BECAUSE KEY LEGISLATORS SAW SIGNS OF SUCH COOPERATION, WHICH VIOLATES OUR LAWS, SOLOMON ARGUED. THE U.S. STRONGLY RECOMMENDS, THEREFORE, THAT PRINCE SIHANOUK DEMONSTRATE AS MUCH POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY INDEPENDENCE FROM THE KHMER ROUGE AS POSSIBLE, WHICH WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE U.S. TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING HIM. DR. SOLOMON SAID THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT THE PRINCE PLANS TO RETURN TO BEIJING ON AUGUST 11 TO HOLD A MEETING OF THE RESISTANCE FACTIONS SOME TIME AFTER AUGUST 23. SHOULD THE PRINCE MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT EMPHASIZING HIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE KR, SOLOMON SAID, THE RESULT COULD BE FURTHER WEAKENING OF OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT HIM. THE U.S., SOLOMON SAID, WANTS PRINCE SIHANOUK TO BE A GENUINELY INDEPENDENT POLITICAL FORCE.

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